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RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE:
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NONSIGNER CLAUSES
MICTHr CONANT t
INTRODUCTION
For a number of years, the Congress of the United States has
debated federal resale price maintenance bills.' Proposed legislation
before the 86th Congress and expected to be reintroduced in the 87th
would allow enforcement of resale price maintenance against any seller
in the chain of distribution who has notice of the established price, even
though the seller is not a party to the resale price contract. The key
sections of these bills provide that:
(6) In the case of merchandise with respect to which a per-
son is a proprietor, it shall be lawful for such a person to establish
and control, by notice to his distributors, stipulated or minimum
resale prices for such merchandise, if such merchandise is in com-
merce or is held for sale after shipment in commerce and is in
free and open competition with merchandise of the same general
class produced by others. He may so establish schedules of resale
prices differentiated with reference to any criteria not otherwise
unlawful. Such schedules may be changed from time to time
by notice to distributors having acquired such merchandise with
notice of any established resale price ....
(7) Except as provided in paragraph (9), it shall be un-
lawful (i) for any distributor with notice of an applicable stipulated
resale price established under paragraph (6) by a proprietor with
respect to merchandise to sell, offer to sell, or advertise such mer-
chandise in commerce, or such merchandise held for sale after
shipment in commerce, at a different price, or (ii) for any dis-
tributor with notice of an applicable minimum resale price so
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1 Hearings on HR. 10527, 10770, 10847, 11048, 11216, 11264 Before a Subcom-
inittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958); Hearings on S. 3850 Before the Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Hearings on H.R. 768, 1253,
2463, 2729, 3187, 5252, 5602 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). For economic
analyses of resale price maintenance, see generally GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER
FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION (1939); HARms, OUR FLOUNDERING FAIR TRADE (1956);
YAMEY, ECONOMIcS OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (1954); Note, 69 HARV. L.
REv. 316, 322-35 (1955) ; statements of economists in the congressional hearings, supra.
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established with respect to merchandise to sell, offer to sell, or
advertise such merchandise in commerce, or such merchandise
held for sale after shipment in commerce, at a lower price.'
Paragraph (7) will be crucial to the success of the proposed
statute. Experience in the operation of resale price maintenance since
1933, under state statutes with exemption from the federal antitrust
laws,3 has shown that enforcement solely through contract is un-
feasible.4 The nonsigner clauses r have been the only realistic avenue
of enforcement against recalcitrant wholesalers and retailers who are
determined to engage in price competition.
The enforcement of resale price maintenance through contracts
presents no problems of constitutionality. Such enforcement is based
on voluntary assent of the parties and is sanctioned by statutes making
this type of price-fixing contract legally enforceable and exempt from
the antitrust laws.6 Hence, this Comment will deal only with the
constitutionality of enforcement against nonsigners.
The highest courts of seventeen states have upheld the nonsigner
clauses of their state resale price maintenance statutes7 while those of
2S. 1083, H.R. 1253, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (to amend § 5(a) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1958)). See generally Maca chlan, A New Approach to Resale Price Maintenance,
11 VAND. L. Ray. 145 (1957).
3 For legislative history, see Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 205 F.2d 788, 790 n.3, 791 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953);
Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 56 F. Supp. 922, 924-27 (E.D. La. 1944).
4 See statement of Herman S. Waller, General Counsel of the National Associ-
ation of Retail Druggists, in Hearings on H.R. 768, 1253, 2463, 2729, 3187, 5252,
5602 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-94 (1959); Bowman, Prerequisites and Effects
of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. Car. L. REv. 825 (1955); Fulda, Resale Price
Maintenance, 21 U. CH. L. REv. 175, 176 (1954).
5 The California nonsigner clause, the first to be passed, is typical: "Wilfully
and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than
the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to this chapter, whether
the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such
contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged
thereby." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16904. Mr. Justice Douglas has described
the nonsigner clauses of resale price maintenance statutes as follows: "That is not
price fixing by contract or agreement; that is price fixing by compulsion. That is
not following the path of consensual agreement; that is resort to coercion." Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 388 (1951). He also described
nonsigner enforcement as "a program whereby recalcitrants are dragged in by the
heels and compelled to submit to price fixing." Id. at 390.
601d Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 192
(1936); General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Co-op., Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354, 359
(Ky. 1958) (dictum).
7 General Elec. Co. v. Telco Supply, Inc., 84 Ariz. 132, 325 P.2d 394 (1958);
Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P.2d 177, aff'd sub nora. Pep Boys
v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S. 198 (1936); Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Johnson
Wholesale Perfume Co., 128 Conn. 596, 24 A.2d 841 (1942) ; General Elec. Co. v. Klein,
34 Del. Ch. 491, 106 A.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. G.E.M.
Sundries Co., 43 Hawaii 103 (1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1960); Seagram-
Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N.E.2d 940, aff'd, 299
U.S. 183 (1936) ; Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939) ;
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another eighteen states have found nonsigner clauses to violate the
state constitutions.8 Since the structure and language of most state
constitutions, being patterned after the federal constitution, are very
similar, this divergence of decision calls for explanation. Nonsigner
clauses in state resale price maintenance laws have been challenged
mainly on two constitutional grounds: first, that they take property
without due process of law, and second, that they constitute an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power to private persons. The
conflicting opinions of the state courts on the definition and scope of
these two constitutional doctrines, as they have been applied in the
review of nonsigner statutes, will be analyzed in an attempt to recon-
cile the decisions by reference to the established meaning of these
constitutional concepts in federal law.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The due process clause of the federal constitution today puts no
limit on state economic regulation except that it may not be wholly
arbitrary.' Recent opinions of the Supreme Court have clearly vindi-
General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 (1956);
W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co. v. Barrett, 209 Miss. 1, 45 So. 2d 833 (1950); Coming
Glass Works v. Max Dichter Co., 161 A.2d 569 (N.H. 1960); Lionel Corp. v.
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 304, appeal dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question, 348 U.S. 859 (1954) ; General Elec. Co. v. Masters,
Inc., 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2cd 802, appeal dismissed for want of a mbstantial federal
question, 348 U.S. 892 (1954); Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d
528 (1939); Burche Co. v. General Elec. Co., 382 Pa. 370, 115 A.2d 361 (1955);
Miles Labs. v. Owl Drug Co., 67 S.D. 523, 295 N.W. 292 (1940); Standard Drug
Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 S.E.2d 289 (Va. 1960) ; Bulova Watch Co. v. Anderson,
270 Wis. 21, 70 N.W.2d 243 (1955).
8 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., 224 Ark. 558,
275 S.W.2d 455 (1955); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301
P.2d 139 (1956); Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371
(Fla. 1949); Cox v. General Elec. Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955); Bissell
Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co., 237 Ind. 188, 143 N.E.2d 415 (1957); Quality
Oil Co. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d 731 (1958);
General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Co-op., Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1958) ; Dr.
G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 231 La.
51, 90 So. 2d 343, 348 (1956); Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting
Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952); Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M.,
Inc., 102 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1960); McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co.,
159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608, modified, 160 Neb. 319 (1955); Skaggs Drug Center
v. General Elec. Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957); Union Carbide & Carbon
Co. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958) ; General Elec.
Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956); Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General
Elec. Co., 231 S.C. 636, 99 S.E.2d 665 (1957); General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales,
Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956); Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 345
P.2d 1085 (Wash. 1959) ; General Elec. Co. v. A. Dandy Appliance Co., 143 W. Va.
491, 103 S.E.4?d 310 (1958).
9 "A violation of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . would depend upon whether
there is any rational basis for the action of the legislature." Sage Stores Co. v.
Kansas ex rel. Mitchell, 323 U.S. 32, 35 (1944). Since "due process" originally meant
full and fair procedure, the creation of substantive due process by the courts has been
termed an usurpation of legislative power. If this be true, then the demise of sub-
stantive due process in the federal courts is merely a return to the original limited
meaning of the power given the courts by the Constitution. CORwIN, COURT OVER
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cated Mr. justice Holmes."0 The legislature in the exercise of the
police power is free to decide what types and methods of regulation
are reasonable, and the Court will not superimpose its views on the
reasonableness of statutes." Only in the rare case in which the Court
should find the statute to be wholly arbitrary and without reason would
it hold the statute unconstitutional.
Consonant with the minimization of substantive due process in
the area of economic controls, price regulation by state and federal
governments has been upheld by the Supreme Court since Nebbia v.
New York.'2  The concept that governmental control is limited to
public utilities-or to businesses affected with a public interest-has
been discarded, and state and federal governments may regulate any
CONSTITUTON 107-08 (1938); Brockelbank, The Role of Due Process in American
Constitutional Law, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 561, 567 (1954). Logically consistent con-
stitutional interpretation would then seem to require, if any of the substantive free-
doms of the first eight amendments are to be protected against state infringement,
that the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, not the due
process clause, incorporates the bill of rights. But this the Court has explicitly held
not to be the case. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947). See 2 CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1083-102
(1953); FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 55-97 (1908).
10 "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (dissenting opinion). "I
think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it
sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express prohibition in the Constitution
of the United States or of the State, and that Courts should be careful not to extend
such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of
public policy that the particular court may happen to entertain . . . . The truth
seems to me to be that, subject to compensation when compensation is due, the legis-
lature may forbid or restrict any business when it has a sufficient force of public
opinion behind it." Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton,
273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
11 In Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), Mr. Justice Douglas,
speaking for a unanimous Court, reversed the holding of a three-judge district court
that three sections of an Oklahoma statute regulating opticians deprived them of
property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth amendment: "The
day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions,
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school
of thought." Id. at 488. "The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful require-
ment in many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts to balance the
advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement . . . . [T]he law need not
be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought
that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it." Id. at
487-88. See Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949).
12291 U.S. 502 (1934). "It is clear that there is no closed class or category of
business affected with a public interest, and the function of courts in the application
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether cir-
cumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of govern-
mental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory . . . . The phrase
'affected with a public interest' can, in the nature of things, mean no more than that
an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good." Id. at
536. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1941), and cases there cited.
For decisions approving price regulation by the federal government, see United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S.
533 (1939). See HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW 400-29 (1952) ; Gray, The Passing
of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND & P.U. EcoN. 8 (1940).
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price for any purpose which is not explicitly prohibited in the federal
constitution. Given this background, it is clear that the nonsigner
clauses of state resale price maintenance statutes, being but one
method of price regulation, do not violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The legislative purpose of the Illinois statute
held constitutional in Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers
Corp." was the protection of business goodwill.' 4 While reasonable
men may debate whether resale price maintenance does promote good-
will, the Court could not possibly find the statute to be wholly arbi-
traiy-that is, without any reason. Because there is no antimonopoly
clause in the federal constitution, the legislative purpose of the state
statute could just as well have been promotion of local monopolies
(those which do not affect interstate commerce). The statute still
would be based on reason and would therefore not violate the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Although the United States Supreme Court has come to realize
that it does not have the investigative machinery to determine whether
particular regulations are reasonable, few state supreme courts have
had the humility to abnegate such power. In the majority of state
courts, substantive due process in the review of economic regulation
still persists.' 5 In construing the due process clauses of their state
constitutions, most state courts continue to review the reasonableness
of statutes, deciding whether the means adopted are reasonably related
to a proper legislative purpose.
In upholding the nonsigner clauses of their state statutes in the face
of challenges under their state constitutional due process clauses, a few
high courts follow the Nebbia rule.' 6 The Massachusetts court, in
13 299 U.S. 183 (1936). The classification was also held not to be arbitrary and
therefore not to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
14 In a substantive due process justification of this purpose, Mr. Justice Suther-
land, perhaps unwittingly, treats the protection of goodwill as the same thing as
protection of trademarks, and thus cites trademark infringement cases to support a
ruling designed to protect through price fixing the general goodwill enjoyed by the
producer. 299 U.S. at 195. There is no direct relation between the trademark (one
instrument to promote goodwill), and price fixing (which was approved here as
another instrument to promote goodwill). See Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 192
F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1951); Bates, Constitutionality of State Fair Trade Acts, 32 IND.
L. Rmv. 127, 148 (1957); Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of Restrictive
Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L.J. 607 (1940); Note, 6 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 110, 120 (1937); Note, 49 YALE L.J. 145 (1939). Having joined in the dissent
in Nebbia, Justice Sutherland would not rely on that case to sustain private price
regulation via the nonsigner clause. See Note, 50 HARV. L. REmv. 667, 670 (1937).
The lower court in the companion case to Old Dcarborn did rely on Nebbia. Joseph
Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N.E.2d 929, aff'd, 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
15 Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of
Law, 53 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 226 (1958); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due
Process in the States, 34 MiNN. L. REv. 91 (1950); Note, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 827
(1953); Comment, 18 Oio ST. L.. 384 (1957).
16General Elec. Co. v. Telco Supply, Inc., 84 Ariz. 132, 325 P.2d 394 (1958),
1 ARiz. L. RIEv. 331 (1959) ; Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P.2d
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rejecting a constitutional attack on the state statute, said: "On this
issue the defendant assumes the burden of showing the absence of any
conceivable ground upon which these enactments may be supported." 17
Most other courts sustaining nonsigner clauses have made a sub-
stantive due process inquiry. Following Mr. Justice Sutherland's
opinion" in the Old Dearborn case,"9 they find price restriction a
legitimate means to protect goodwill and therefore a reasonable exer-
cise of the police power. They find the limiting of so-called "harmful
competition" to be an exercise of the police power in the interest of
public health, morals, comfort, or safety, or in the promotion of public
welfare.
Those state courts holding the nonsigner clauses of their state
statutes to violate the due process clause of the state constitution have,
of course, utilized substantive due process concepts. Some of these
courts emphasize that the right to set a price on goods in which the
seller has title is a valuable property right,20 and hold that this prop-
erty right may not be impaired by an exercise of state police power,
reasoning that price regulation is permissible only after a judicial find-
ing that the industry is "affected with a public interest." Other courts
find that the legislated price fixing of the nonsigner clause is not reason-
ably related to public safety, health, morals, or welfare.2 Here again,
177, aff'd, 299 U.S. 198 (1936); Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distrib.
Co., 363 Ill. 610, 2 N.E.2d 940, aft'd, 299 U.S. 183 (1936) ; Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders,
216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939); Burche Co. v. General Elec. Co., 382 Pa. 370,
115 A.2d 361 (1955).
17 General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 675, 132 N.E._d
652, 657 (1956).
18 Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 128 Conn.
596, 24 A.2d 841 (1942); General Elec. Co. v. Klein, 34 Del. Ch. 491, 106 A.2d 206
(Sup. Ct. 1954); Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. G.E.M. Sundries Co., 43 Hawaii 103
(1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1960); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176
Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939); W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co. v. Barrett, 209 Miss. 1, 45
So. 2d 838 (1950) ; Coming Glass Works v. Max Dichter Co., 161 A.2d 569 (N.H.
1960); Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 304,
appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 348 U.S. 859 (1954);
General Elec. Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802, appeal dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question, 348 U.S. 892 (1954) ; Miles Labs. v. Owl
Drug Co., 67 S.D. 523, 295 N.W. 292 (1940); Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec.
Co., 117 S.E.2d 289 (Va. 1960).
19 See note 14 supra.
20 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., 224 Ark. 558,
275 S.W.2d 455 (1955); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301
P.2d 139 (1956) ; General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Co-op., Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354
(Ky. 1958) ; General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956) ; Rogers-
Kent, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 231 S.C. 636, 99 S.E.2d 665 (1957).
21 Miles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954) ; Cox v. General Elec.
Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955); Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop
Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952); McGraw Elec. Co. v.
Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608, -modified, 160 Neb. 319
(1955) ; Skaggs Drug Center v. General Elec. Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957) ;
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d
481 (1958) ; Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, 345 P.2d 1085 (Wash. 1959) ; General
Elec. Co. v. A. Dandy Appliance Co., 143 W. Va. 491, 103 S.E.2d 310 (1958). See
35 WASH. L. REv. 181 (1960).
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unconstitutionality is based on a judicial finding of fact that the means
adopted by the legislature to protect goodwill are unreasonable.
In clinging to the public utility concept, the courts sustaining the
due process objection to nonsigner clauses ignore the federal view as
seen in Nebbia and Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond
Ass'n.2 2 Some of them even cite earlier federal cases, which though
not explicitly overruled by the Nebbia case, were clearly repudiated by
its rule. 3 They thus conclude that the state has no power to regulate
price for most products and, consequently, has no power to authorize
private control over such prices other than by contract.24
Legislative approval of anticompetitive price fixing for some
products as beneficial to public welfare has been overruled in these
cases by a judicial disposition to promote competition. In the absence
of express state constitutional prohibition of anticompetitive statutes,
the courts rationalize the interposition of their own views by holding
that the due process clauses of their state constitutions require that
"liberty" or "property" be given substantial substantive protection.
25
Such Benthamite concepts of absolute liberty have, however, been
examined and proved wanting.26
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PRIVATE PERSONS
Delegation of legislative power is defined as the authorization to
issue rules having legal effect-that is, enforceable through compul-
sion by the state.2 Once the basic structure of a law has been estab-
lished by statute, the legislature may delegate to the chief executive or
other governmental body the power to make detailed rules for the
22 313 U.S. 236 (1941) ; see note 12 .mupra.
2 3 See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., 224 Ark. 558,
561, 275 S.W.2d 455, 457 (1955), citing Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915);
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 185-86, 301 P.2d 139, 152
(1956), citing Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc v. Banton, 273
U.S. 418 (1927), and Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
262 U.S. 522 (1923) ; Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co.,
334 Mich. 109, 116, 54 N.W.2d 268, 271 (1952), citing Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S.
350 (1928), Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, vipra,
and Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, .mipra; General
Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 319, 296 P.2d 635, 643 (1956), citing New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), and Tyson & Brother-United Theatre
Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, .upra.
24 Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, supra note 23; Cox v. General Elec.
Co., 211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.,d 514 (1955).
2 5 General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Co-op., Inc., 316 S.W.2d 354 (Ky.
1958); General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956).
26 Vest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-93 (1937); COHEN,
ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 75-83 (1933); Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18
YALE L.. 454 (1909); Note, 8 W. RES. L. REv. 57 (1956).
27 Ross, Delegation of Power, 7 Am. J. Cou'T. L. 1, 17 (1958).
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statute's operation.2 8 These rules must conform to the statutory stand-
ard,29 be adopted after hearing,3° and be subject to judicial review.
31
It is these safeguards which satisfy the procedural requirements of
due process of law.32 In the matter of price regulation, state legis-
latures have delegated to public service commissions the authority to
fix rates or prices in conformance with the constitutional procedures.
3
The action of a public utility commission in regulating rates is legis-
lative in character and is subject to the same tests and commands as
a legislative enactment. 4 Both the legislature and the commission
exercise a sovereign power of government.
The delegation of legislative power to private persons is another
matter. When the power of government to use compulsion in enforc-
ing rules is delegated to private persons, there is created a new, private
government, and private government violates the essential concept of a
democratic society. It is not subject to the requirements of hearing
and judicial review as is elected government, and it may oppress an
unwilling minority to the full extent of the delegated power. For these
reasons, legislative power in a democratic society is vested solely in the
elected legislature. Although it may be delegated in limited ways to
other responsible governmental bodies, a discretionary regulatory
power over prices, rates, or wages may not be delegated to private
persons.35  In A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
2 8 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946); Norwegian
Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 305 (1933); United States v.
Shreveport Grain & Elev. Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,
692-93 (1892). See 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIoNs 228-30 (8th ed. 1927) ;
Jaffe, An Essay on the Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLUm. L. REv. 359, 561
(1947).
29 "[T]o uphold the delegation there is need to discover in the terms of the act
a standard reasonably clear whereby discretion must be governed." Panama Ref. Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 434 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). See 1 DAvis, ADMIN-
isTnRin LAw TRATISE § 2.03 (1958).
3 0 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1938).
31 The action of a regulatory commission may not be arbitrary or confiscatory
and this is a question for the courts. See Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287, 304-05 (1933); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 294, 318 (1933) ; Northern Pac. Ry. v. Department of Pub. Works,
268 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1925).
32 Compare Administrative Procedure Act §§ 1-11, 60 Stat 237 (1946), as
amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958), as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 1900 (1958),
as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1105 (Supp. 1959), where the constitutional safeguards with
respect to the operation of federal administrative agencies are embodied and elabo-
rated.
83 Pennsylvania R.R. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6 (1917). Compare Wichita R.R. &
Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1922).
3 4 Price regulation is legislative in that it "looks to the future and changes
existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some
part of those subject to its power." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S.
210, 226 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
35 1 DAvis, ADmINIsTRATinn LAW TREATISE § 2.14 (1958), points out that the
constitutional law on delegation of legislative power to private persons "has not
crystallized any consistent principles," id. at 138, and is "unsteady and conflicting,"
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States," one of the two main grounds for holding the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act unconstitutional was that it delegated the power to
fix wages and hours in the poultry slaughtering industry to an industry
trade group."7 And in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,"8 the sections of the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act giving to the producers of two-
thirds of the tonnage and to a majority of the miners the power to fix
wages and hours in their districts was held to constitute an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power."s
Following this reasoning, the high courts of four states have in-
validated the nonsigner clauses of resale price maintenance statutes
solely on the ground of unconstitutional delegation of the states' legis-
lative power." Five other states regarded unconstitutional delegation
as one ground, though not the sole basis, for holding their nonsigner
id. at 141. Most of the conflicting cases concern the constitutionality of laws allowing
a given percentage of the parties who are to be affected by a statutory rule to vote
whether it will become effective. Except for the resale price maintenance laws, none
upholds a discretionary regulatory power of private persons over others' prices.
Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201, 217 (1937), notes
the resale price maintenance exception as an unprecedented legislative extension of
the law of property and contract which the courts at that time permitted to override
conflicting constitutional principles. See Note, 37 CoLum. L. REv. 447 (1937). Un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power to private groups, inasmuch as it lacks
the procedural safeguards of constitutional government, probably violates procedural
due process also. From this point of view, the decision in Old Dearborn Distrib. Co.
v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936), discussed in notes 13-14 .mpra and
accompanying text, is in error.
386295 U.S. 495 (1935).
37 "But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legis-
lative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them
to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficient for the rehabilitation and
expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or
groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations
or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? .... .. The answer is
obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is
utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress."
295 U.S. at 537. The question of delegation of legislative power to private persons
was reached in Schechter after the section of the act providing for presidential
approval of private codes had been held unconstitutional for lack of intelligible
standards.
38298 U.S. 238 (1936).
39 "The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to regulate
the affairs of an unwilling minority. This is legislative delegation in its most ob-
noxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, pre-
sumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often
are adverse to the interests of others in the same business . . . . [A] statute which
attempts to confer such power undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional inter-
ference with personal liberty and private property." 298 U.S. at 311.
40 Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co., 237 Ind. 188, 194-95, 143 N.E.2d
415, 419 (1957) ; Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488,
322 P.2d 731 (1958); Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros.
Giant Super Markets, 231 La. 51, 66, 74, 90 So. 2d 343, 348, 351 (1956) ; Remington
Arms Co. v. G.E.M., Inc., 102 N.W.2d 528, 534 (Minn. 1960). Citing with approval
the Minnesota decision, a lower court in Iowa held that state's nonsigner clause
unconstitutional. Bulova Watch Co. v. Robinson Wholesale Co., TRADE REG. REP.
(1960 Trade Cas.) 69752 (Iowa Dist. Ct. May 27, 1960). See 27 FORDIHAm L. REv.
68, 72 (1958) ; 18 LA. L. Rev. 178 (1957).
19611
548 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.109:539
clauses to violate their state constitutions.41 Coercive regulation of
resale prices is no different from other price regulation-therefore, it
is solely a legislative function. And since the quality, quantity, and
packaging of a trademarked article are all determined by the manu-
facturer, the one significant factor--other than the choice of marketing
procedures-which can be controlled by wholesalers and retailers is
price. Regulation of price, whether maximum, minimum, or fixed,
thus deprives the wholesaler or retailer of the key area of discretion in
his marketing plan.
The regulatory power over price in the typical nonsigner statute
is enforceable by injunction and contempt. proceedings. The manu-
facturer (or wholesaler) who establishes a resale price may thus control
the price policy of those not in contract with him by compelling un-
willing middlemen not to resell at a lower price. After retailers have
stocked their shelves with his product in reliance on the existence of
one established resale price, the manufacturer may use his regulatory
power to raise the established resale price to a level where sales are
much slower and retailers' inventories excessive. Thus the producer
has uncontrolled sovereignty over the price at which retailers not in
contract with him will sell so long as he establishes price pursuant to
the state statute. The retailer has no right to hearing or judicial re-
view of arbitrary action in the setting of the price. Nor is the pro-
ducer bound by any intelligible standard in the price he sets. It is for
these reasons that nonsigner clauses have been held unconstitutional
delegations of legislative power to private persons.
Not all courts accept this approach. In the Old Dearborn case,
42
the Supreme Court held that the nonsigner clause of the Illinois statute
was not a delegation of state legislative power which would violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal consti-
tution. Since no delegation of federal legislative power was involved,
only the due process aspects could be subject to binding federal deci-
sion.43  The Court reasoned that appellant nonsigner knew of the re-
41 Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956);
Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949) ; McGraw
Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608, modified, 106
Neb. 319 (1955); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio
St. 182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958), 27 U. CINc. L. REv. 329, 9 W. REs. L. REv. 509;
General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956). For a lower court
decision in Oklahoma which relies upon unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power as one ground for voiding a nonsigner statute, see Revlon, Inc. v. American
Mut. Co., 1959 Trade Cas. 75894 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Oct. 16, 1959). See also Note,
25 U. CINc. L. REv. 466 (1956).
42 Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194
(1936) ; see Note, 63 YALE L.J. 538, 543 (1954) ; 36 CORNELL L.Q. 781, 783-84 (1951).
43 See Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 168 (1923) ; McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis
& Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 720, 68 N.W.2d 608, 617, modified, 160 Neb. 319
(1955).
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striction before he bought the goods, and, therefore, the restriction ran
with the acquisition and conditioned it. The Court in effect held that
the Illinois statute and Illinois Supreme Court approval of what
amounted to an equitable servitude on chattels 44-here trademarked
goods-met all the federal procedural requirements necessary for the
adoption of such a rule and thus did not violate the due process clause
of the federal constitution.
Old Dearborn is not precedent for deciding whether the nonsigner
clause of any state resale price statute delegates state legislative power
to private individuals in violation of the state constitution.45 Neverthe-
less, high courts of such populous commercial states as New York,46
Massachusetts,47 Pennsylvania,48 New Jersey,49 and California-1o have
erroneously cited Old Dearborn as sufficient authority that their state
constitutions are not violated by their nonsigner statutes. An equitable
servitude on chattels in the form of price control was held not to violate
the state constitutions even though it was necessary to delegate the
sovereign power of state government to private persons in order to
effect such a servitude. The high courts of Illinois " and Maryland 12
44 See Chafee, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and
Chattels, 69 HRV. L. REv. 1250, 1254-55 (1956); Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on
Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REv. 945, 987-95 (1928). See also GRAY, REsTRAINTS oN
THE ALIENATION 1OF PROPERTY §§ 27, 28 (2d ed. 1895).
45 1 DAvis, ADMiNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §2.14 (1958); Note, Fair Trade
and the State Constitutions-A New Trend, 10 VAND. L. REv. 415, 417 (1957).
46 Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N.Y. 167, 171, 7 N.E.2d 30, 31 (1937).
The Bourjois case was followed in General Elec. Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307 N.Y. 229,
237-38, 120 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1954). Compare Levine v. O'Connell, 275 App. Div.
217, 88 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 658, 91 N.E.2d 322 (1950), where it
was held that the state Alcoholic Beverage Control Law authorizing the State
Liquor Authority, at its discretion, to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages except
pursuant to fair trade contracts was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.
47 General Elec. Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 676-77, 132 N.E.2d
652, 659 (1956). Compare In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 337 Mass.
796, 151 N.E.2d 631 (1958).
4 8 Burche Co. v. General Elec. Co., 382 Pa. 370, 373-74, 115 A.2d 361, 362-63
(1955).
49Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 15 N.J. 191, 197-98, 104 A.2d
304, 306-07 (1954).
50 Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 888, 291
P.2d 936, 940 (1955). Three years earlier, the same court held a delegation of power
to fix minimum prices to an administrative board of interested members of an industry
to be an unconstitutional delegation to private persons. State Board of Dry Cleaners
v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 436, 448, 254 P.2d 29, 36 (1953); see
Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal. 2d 141,
157-59, 346 P.2d 737, 746-47 (1959) (Peters, J., dissenting).
51 Kinsey Distilling Sales Co. v. Foremost Liquor Stores, Inc., 15 Ill. 2d 182,
189, 154 N.E.2d 290, 294 (1958). The Illinois Supreme Court in other cases has
professed strong adherence to the principle that the sovereign power to legislate may
not be delegated to private persons. See People ex rel. Chicago Dryer Co. v. Chicago,
413 Ill. 315, 109 N.E.2d 201 (1952), and cases cited therein.
5 2 Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 688, 7 A.2d 176, 179 (1939).
See the similarly erroneous contract emphasis in Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay
Less Drug Stores, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291 P.2d 936 (1955).
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committed an additional error in relying on Old Dearborn as precedent
for the state constitutionality of nonsigner clauses by quoting those
sections of the case that approve fair trade contracts as not violative
of federal due process. 3  The nonsigner clause as not violative of
federal due process is discussed in Old Dearborn two pages later. 4
Those decisions which follow Old Dearborn hold that the re-
tailer's knowledge of the established resale price before he purchases
the particular goods is sufficient reason to find that there is no un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power. 55 This, however, is a
non sequitur: notice to the nonsigner of established resale prices may
warn him not to buy those goods or that his purchase of them is
conditioned; but if he does buy them, he still comes under the coercive
price control of a party not in contract with him. These cases uni-
formly ignore the body of law holding that compulsory price regula-
tion is a legislative function. They conclude that the legislation is
complete upon passage and that manufacturers' price regulation pur-
suant to it is not legislative. Other decisions seem to treat the delega-
tion as the same thing as delegation to a government commission and
emphasize a finding that the statute has intelligible standards. 56 More-
over, these cases ignore the fact that the requirement of intelligible
standards is only one of three basic elements of due process in adminis-
trative law. Fair hearing and judicial review are not available when
a seller establishes resale prices which his buyer believes to be too
high. Still other courts, following Old Dearborn, hold that the state
delegation of price control power to private producers or sellers is
not unconstitutional because it is adopted in support of the primary
purpose of protecting a property interest in goodwill or trademarks.5 7
This argument says, in effect, if the purpose of the statute is consti-
tutional, a traditionally unconstitutional means may be adopted by the
legislature to achieve that purpose-a view contrary to the basic prin-
ciples of constitutional government.
53 299 U.S. at 192.
54 299 U.S. at 194.
-5Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 177, 4 S.E.2d 528, 537 (1939);
Weco Prods. Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 484, 274 N.W. 426, 429 (1937);
see Esterbrook Pen Co. v. San Juan F. Vilarino 5 y 10, 144 F. Supp. 309, 313
(D.P.R. 1956). See also Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 564, 2 N.E.2d
929, 932, aff'd sub norn. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299
U.S. 183 (1936).5 6 Corning Glass Works v. Max Dichter Co., 161 A.2d 569, 574 (N.H. 1960).
The effectiveness of one of these standards is questioned in Herman, Free and Open
Competition, 9 STAN. L. REv. 323 (1957).5 7 E.g., Kinsey Distilling Sales Co. v. Foremost Liquor Stores, Inc., 15 Ill. 2d 182,
188, 154 N.E.2d 290, 293 (1958) ; see Note, 50 HARv. L. REv. 667, 670 (1937) ; Com-
ment, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 664.
58 This rule is seen most clearly where a governmental body has been granted
the power to punish persons for criminal activity but adopts a procedure which is
unconstitutional. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), reversing on rehearing
351 U.S. 487 (1956).
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OTHER BASES OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Utah has held the nonsigner clause of its state resale price statute
to violate the state constitutional prohibition on "any combination
. . . having for its object or effect the controlling of the price of any
products of the soil, or of any article of manufacture or commerce." '1
But in other states with constitutional proscriptions of monopolies,
nonsigner clauses have been held not violative of such provisions.6"
The usual reasoning of the courts in these cases is that their constitu-
tions prohibit only complete monopolies of a trade or product and do
not bar vertical price-fixing agreements for individual products. This
reasoning is applied even though a large majority of the producers of
a type of product establish the same relatively high resale price for
their comparable products.
The Florida nonsigner statute was held arbitary and violative of
due process in part because it served a private rather than a public
purpose.6 The Nebraska clause was held to create unconstitutional
special privileges and immunities.0 2 And the Oregon nonsigner stat-
ute was held to violate the state constitutional rights of contract and
property. 3
CONCLUSION
Violation of constitutional due process, as the basis of an attack
on the nonsigner clauses of state resale price statutes, has a funda-
mental weakness. The original meaning of due process was limited
to procedure, and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
over the last twenty-five years have repudiated the substantive due
process attack on economic regulation by state or federal governments.
Although the high courts of twelve states have held that state non-
59 General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956),
42 CORNELL L.Q. 407 (1957), 5 UTAH L. REV. 279 (1956).
60 Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942); Goldsmith
v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A.2d 176 (1939) ; W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co.
v. Barrett, 209 Miss. 1, 45 So. 2d 838 (1950) ; Ely Lilly Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C.
163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939); Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros.
Giant Super Markets, 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956) (dictum); Skaggs Drug
Center v. General Elec. Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957) (dictum). In Ten-
nessee, the contracts section of the resale price statute was held not to violate the
state monopoly prohibition. Frankfort Distillers Corp. v. Liberto, 190 Tenn. 478,
230 S.W.2d 971 (1950).
61 Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
62 McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d
608, modified, 160 Neb. 319 (1955).
63 General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635, 647 (1956) (alternative
holding).
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signer statutes violate the due process clauses of their state constitu-
tions, these decisions may not have the stability and permanence that
constitutional protections should afford in a democratic society. These
courts which, during a period of general prosperity and few bank-
ruptcies, have found nonsigner statutes not reasonably related to public
welfare may change their minds and reverse themselves if the next
constitutional test of such statutes is brought during a recession. They
have the views of sixteen other state high courts on which to rely for
the proposition that nonsigner statutes do not violate constitutional due
process. And this is also the view of the United States Supreme
Court.
Ambigous constitutional concepts, such as substantive due process,
vest great power in courts. Under a system of judicial supremacy,
a power in courts to interpose their views on the reasonableness of
statutes allows judicial usurpation of legislative power. And judicial
conservatism can block experimentation by the legislature in new
methods of social control and impede the adaptation of law to a
changing society. 4
Unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is a more soundly
reasoned attack on nonsigner clauses. Counsel for nonsigner de-
fendants who have cut prices in violation of established resale price
schedules would be well advised to center a constitutional defense
entirely on this ground and bypass the questionable due process de-
fense. The key to success is to demonstrate to the court that non-
signer statutes are compulsory price regulation laws and that price
regulation is a legislative function. The conclusion of unconstitutional-
ity follows directly from these premises and from the principle of law
that sovereign legislative power is vested only in elected government.
The proposed federal resale price maintenance law, set forth in
the introduction to this Comment, is a clear delegation of federal
legislative power to private persons. The language of the statute indi-
cates its purpose of price regulation and of giving power for such regu-
lation to private manufacturers and distributors. A statute with simi-
lar language was adopted in Ohio in 1959 5 after that state's former
6 Llewellyn, Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 AM. EcoN. REv.
665 (1925).
65 OH O Rxv. CODE ANN. § 1333.29 (Page Supp. 1960) : "It shall be lawful . . .
for a proprietor to establish and control by notice to distributors or by contract,
stipulated minimum resale prices for a commodity of which he is the proprietor and
which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class
produced by others and offered for sale in the same general market area. Such
minimum resale prices may be differentiated as to various levels of distribution, pro-
vided such differentiations are not unlawfully discriminatory. Such prices may be
changed from time to time by written notice to distributors who acquired such com-
modity with notice of any established minimum resale price."
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resale price maintenance statute had been held unconstitutional. Two
lower courts have already held the new Ohio act unconstitutional
on the ground that it delegates legislative power to private persons. 66
It is reasonable to predict that if the federal resale price statute is
passed, it will suffer the same fate in the federal courts.
6 6 Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co., TRDE: REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.)
ff 69778 (Ohio C.P. July 28, 1960); Helena Rubinstein, Inc. v. Cincinnati Vitamin &
Cosmetic Distribs. Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) ff 69720 (Ohio C.P.
May 23, 1960).
